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Abstract
Safeguarding privacy in machine learning is highly desirable, especially in collaborative studies
across many organizations. Privacy-preserving distributed machine learning (based on cryptography)
is popular to solve the problem. However, existing cryptographic protocols still incur excess compu-
tational overhead. Here, we make a novel observation that this is partially due to naive adoption of
mainstream numerical optimization (e.g., Newton method) and failing to tailor for secure computing.
This work presents a contrasting perspective: customizing numerical optimization specifically for secure
settings. We propose a seemingly less-favorable optimization method that can in fact significantly accel-
erate privacy-preserving logistic regression. Leveraging this new method, we propose two new secure
protocols for conducting logistic regression in a privacy-preserving and distributed manner. Extensive
theoretical and empirical evaluations prove the competitive performance of our two secure proposals
while without compromising accuracy or privacy: with speedup up to 2.3x and 8.1x, respectively, over
state-of-the-art; and even faster as data scales up. Such drastic speedup is on top of and in addition to
performance improvements from existing (and future) state-of-the-art cryptography. Our work provides
a new way towards efficient and practical privacy-preserving logistic regression for large-scale studies
which are common for modern science.
1 Introduction
Data integration and joint analytics (i.e., machine learning) in a distributed network of independent databases
(belonging to different organizations) is widely used in various disciplines, such as in data management [Zhang
and Zhao, 2005, Verykios et al., 2004, Aggarwal and Philip, 2008], biomedical and social sciences [McCarty
et al., 2011, Zheng et al., 2017] where data are distributed in nature and single databases only have limited
samples sizes. The goal of such multi-organization joint analytics is to accumulate large sample sizes across
databases/organizations and reach more powerful machine learning conclusions.
Such practice of joint analytics across distributed multi-organization databases, however, is often ham-
pered by serious privacy issues as these studies typically involve human subject data (e.g., electronic medical
records, human genome) that are sensitive and strictly protected by various privacy laws and regulations [Of-
fice for Civil Rights, 2002, Hudson et al., 2008, Daries et al., 2014]. Meanwhile, many participating orga-
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nizations are also reluctant to reveal their data content to external entities (due to concerns around privacy
and business secrets), even though they still want to contribute to collaborative studies. This is increasingly
common in many disciplines concerning data management, such as healthcare and biomedicine [Li et al.,
2015, Wu et al., 2012b], business, finance, etc.
More formally, we are interested in the following common scenario (traditionally known as privacy-
preserving distributed data mining in data management and machine learning [Verykios et al., 2004, Zhang
and Zhao, 2005, Aggarwal and Philip, 2008]): multiple independent organizations (e.g., different institu-
tions, medical centers) want to conduct joint analytics (such as logistic regression). They each possess their
respective private data of a sub-population (e.g., electronic medical records, human genomes, or psychology
surveys), but are not willing or permitted to disclose the data beyond their respective organizations due to
privacy and proprietary reasons. We focus on the horizontally partitioned setting [Aggarwal and Philip,
2008], where each independent database contains only a sub-population (i.e., some rows). In such a collab-
orative study across distributed databases, potential adversaries include: distrustful aggregation center (e.g.,
due to breached servers or malicious employees), distrustful member organizations (due to curiosity about
other organizations’ secrets or business competition), and external curious people or hackers. The adver-
sary’s goal is to learn privacy-sensitive information of individual data records or organizations by peeking
into raw and summary-level data. The challenge here is on how to support such a collaborative study while
preserving privacy, especially when it is difficult or economically impractical to find a fully entrusted central
authority to directly aggregate (“union”) all databases.
Privacy-preserving distributed data mining leveraging cryptography (secure multi-party computation in
particular) and distributed computing is a classical and reviving solution for tackling the challenge [Aggar-
wal and Philip, 2008]. Numerous efforts have attempted to support data mining in distributed databases
without disclosing raw and intermediate data [Aggarwal and Philip, 2008, Nardi et al., 2012, Nikolaenko
et al., 2013, Xie et al., 2014, Boker et al., 2015, Li et al., 2016]. Among these, significant attention is devoted
to logistic regression [Wolfson et al., 2010, El Emam et al., 2013, Nardi et al., 2012, Li et al., 2016, Aono
et al., 2016], one of the most popular statistical methods.
Despite encouraging progress, very few proposals have seen wide adoption in real world for privacy-
preserving logistic regression. The main reason is still the excess computational overhead of cryptographic
methods, despite recent improvements in cryptography alone (represented and partially summarized by
[Liu et al., 2015]). While it is generally expected for secure computation to be slower than non-secure
counterparts, we also make a novel and surprising observation: much of the computational overhead indeed
traces back to the sub-optimal technical decisions made by humans experts (e.g., authors of cryptographic
solutions) and could have been avoided. For instance, nearly all existing secure protocols [El Emam et al.,
2013, Li et al., 2016] directly apply mainstream (distributed) model estimation algorithms (e.g., the popular
Newton method for logistic regression [Harrell, 2015]), failing to account for secure computing-specific
characteristics and thus missing valuable opportunities for performance improvement. Our work here is
motivated to leverage our novel observation and correct for a wide-spread suboptimal practice in privacy-
preserving data mining.
In this work, we propose a different approach to making privacy-preserving logistic regression much
more efficient and practical: Instead of following common practice of taking “off-the-shelf” numerical
optimization algorithms (e.g., Newton method) and focusing on accelerating the underlying cryptography
alone (pervasive among nearly all related secure protocols [Aggarwal and Philip, 2008]), we propose to
tailor numerical optimization specially for cryptographic computing in general (but not tied to any specific
cryptographic schemes or implementations), which then can be built upon whatever state-of-the-art cryp-
tography available now and in future. Our new approach significantly accelerates overall computation in
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addition to enjoying latest advancement from state-of-the-art cryptography, while guaranteeing privacy and
result accuracy.
In our proposed new numerical optimizer (termed PrivLogit), we derive a constant approximation for
the second-order curvature information (i.e., Hessian) in the Newton method for logistic regression. This
adapted optimizer seems counter-intuitive and “unfavorable” due to its elongated convergence and increased
network interactions, but surprisingly turns out to be highly competitive in overall performance. Following
PrivLogit, we propose and evaluate two highly-efficient cryptographic protocols for privacy-preserving dis-
tributed logistic regression, i.e., PrivLogit-Hessian and PrivLogit-Local.
Extensive theoretical and experimental evaluations show that our method is significantly more efficient
and practical, make secure data management closer towards real-world deployment.
Contributions Our contributions are as follows:
• We make a novel observation about a generic performance bottleneck in privacy-preserving logistic
regression, i.e., directly building on de facto optimization algorithms originally designed for non-
cryptography settings. This interesting observation has long been neglected by the domain.
• Based on above observation, we propose a counter-intuitive but surprisingly much better model es-
timation method (i.e., PrivLogit) for privacy-preserving logistic regression. This provides a entirely
different perspective for privacy-preserving distributed logistic regression, by showing that tailoring
numerical optimizers for secure computing can lead to significant unexpected performance gains.
• We propose two highly-efficient secure protocols (i.e., PrivLogit-Hessian and PrivLogit-Local) for
privacy-preserving logistic regression, which significantly outperforms state-of-the-art alternatives
based on the same latest cryptographic schemes and tools.
• We provide detailed theoretical proof and analysis on our proposals.
• We extensively evaluate our proposals on various simulated and real-world studies of very large scale,
many of which are significantly larger than previously reported in the literature. As a side result, we
also present and evaluate the first comprehensive secure implementation/protocol of Newton method
based on latest cryptography (as our baseline).
Outlines We first provide background on logistic regression and model estimation methods in Section 2.
In Sections 3 and 4, we describe our improved optimization method PrivLogit, and two secure implementa-
tions. In Section 5, we elaborate on theoretical details regarding model convergence proof, security analysis,
and computational complexity of our proposals. This is followed by experimental results in Section 6. In
Section 7, we survey related works. We discuss and conclude in Section 8.
2 Preliminaries
This manuscript roughly follows the notations in Table 1.
2.1 Logistic Regression
This work concerns conducting logistic regression in a multi-organization (distributed) environment. Lo-
gistic regression is a probabilistic model that is often used for binary (i.e., categorical) classification [Harrell,
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Table 1: Notations.
Notations Remarks
X ∈ Rn×p Regression covariates: n samples, p features
y ∈ Rn Regression response vector: n samples
β ∈ Rp Regression coefficients
H, H˜ ∈ Rp×p Hessian, approximate Hessian matrices
g ∈ Rp Gradient
λ ∈ R Regression regularization parameter
l2(β) Log-likelihood (objective)
Enc(data) Encryption of data
⊕,	,⊗, Secure arithmetics for +,−,×,÷
Esqrt(data) Secure square root of data
2015]. It is among the most utilized statistical models in practice, with wide adoption in biomedicine [Lowrie
and Lew, 1990], genetics [Lewis and Knight, 2012], online advertising [McMahan et al., 2013], etc. Briefly,
the logistic regression is defined as:
p(y = 1|x;β) = 1
1 + e−βTx
, (1)
where p(.) denotes the probability of the binary response variable y equal to 1 (i.e., “case” or “success” in
practice), x is the p-dimensional covariates for a specific data record, and β is the p-dimensional regression
coefficients we want to estimate.
In practice, regularization is often applied to the model estimation process to aid feature selection and
prevent overfitting by penalizing extreme parameters [Nigam, 1999]. Here we consider the popular `2-
regularization for logistic regression [Nigam, 1999] to make our work generically applicable. The standard
logistic regression can be derived by simply setting the regularization to 0. The `2-regularized logistic
regression imposes an additional regularization term, −λ2βTβ, to the optimization objective during model
estimation. For a dataset (X ∈ Rn×p,y ∈ Rn) = [(x1, y1), ..., (xn, yn)] with n independent samples and p
features, the log-likelihood (i.e., optimization objective) of `2-regularized logistic regression is:
l2(β) =
n∑
i=1
[yi(β
Txi)− log(1 + eβTxi)]− λ
2
βTβ , (2)
where λ is the predefined penalty parameter to tune the regularization.
2.2 Distributed Newton Method
When fitting a (regularized) logistic regression, the goal is to estimate the coefficients β from existing
training data (X,y). Since logistic regression does not have a closed form, model estimation is often
accomplished by (iterative) numerical optimization over the objective l2(β). The de facto approach for
estimating the (regularized) logistic regression coefficient β (Equation 1) is the Newton method [Harrell,
2015], which is widely implemented in most statistical software and underlying nearly all existing protocols
for privacy-preserving logistic regression (e.g., [Wolfson et al., 2010, El Emam et al., 2013, Li et al.,
2016]). Newton method iteratively approaches the optimal coefficients, and for each iteration, the coefficient
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estimates are updated by:
β(t+1) = β(t) −H−1(β(t)) g(β(t)) , (3)
where H(β(t)) and g(β(t)) denote the Hessian and gradient of the objective l2(β) (Equation 2) evaluated
at the current β(t) coefficient estimate. The superscripts (t), (t + 1) denote the tth, (t + 1)th iterations,
respectively. This updating process iterates until model convergence.
Based on Equation 2, the gradient and Hessian for `2-regularized logistic regression can be computed as
follows (setting λ = 0 will skip regularization and yield the standard logistic regression):
g(β) = ∇βl2(β) = XT (y − p)− λβ =
S∑
j=1
gj(β)− λβ , (4)
H(β) =
d2l2(β)
dβdβT
= −XTAX− λI =
S∑
j=1
Hj(β)− λI , (5)
where X represents covariates of n samples and p features; y denotes the response vector of n data records;
p ∈ Rn is the vector of logistic regression probabilities for n records; A ∈ Rn×n is a diagonal matrix
with elements defined as ai,i = pi(1 − pi); and gj(β) and Hj(β) are the per-organization gradient and
Hessian, respectively, that will be introduced afterwards in the distributed version; S is the total number of
organizations contributing data to the collaborative study.
As is also manifested in the last equalities of Equations 4 and 5, the computation of both g(β) andH(β)
can be decomposed per participating organizations (who can freely access their respective private data such
as Xj ,yj), and thus need not invoke expensive cryptographic computation (except for the final summation
across organizations).
3 PrivLogit: a Tailored Optimizer for Fast Privacy-preserving Logistic Re-
gression
Here, we first analyze the problems with mainstream secure Newton method that is underlying nearly all
existing solutions for privacy-preserving logistic regression. This motivates us to customize a better opti-
mization method (PrivLogit) specially for secure computing (but not tied to any particular cryptographic
scheme or implementation). We later analyze the attractive properties of PrivLogit, which seem obscure at
first sight.
3.1 Limitations of Newton Method.
To estimate regression coefficients via the aforementioned Newton method (Equations 3), the evaluation
and inversion of the Hessian have to be repeated for every iteration until model convergence. These two
operations can be prohibitively expensive in computation and network communication especially when im-
plemented using cryptography.
For (distributed) Newton method in general (e.g., non-secure applications), it has been well acknowl-
edged that the evaluation and inversion of the Hessian matrix are the overall computational bottleneck due
to large data sizes, inherent complexity and repetitive nature of these operations [Liu and Nocedal, 1989].
This in fact has motivated numerous improved optimizers in machine learning and optimization [Liu and
Nocedal, 1989]. Unfortunately, most such newer optimizers do not seem amenable to efficient and data-
agnostic secure implementation and thus are not used by the cryptography and privacy community).
5
In data security and privacy research, the issue of expensive Newton method is exacerbated as secure
inversion of Hessian matrix requires complex operations (e.g., secure division and square root) which have
to resort to expensive primitives and approximations from secure multi-party computation [Nardi et al.,
2012, El Emam et al., 2013]. As a result, almost all existing secure logistic regression proposals have
to compromise privacy protection or result accuracy to increase performance (e.g., to selectively reveal
intermediate data/computations [Li et al., 2016] or to use approximations [Nardi et al., 2012, Aono et al.,
2016]).
3.2 PrivLogit for Privacy-preserving Logistic Regression.
We are motivated to design a tailored optimizer for secure computing by addressing the aforementioned
limitations of Newton method. Our proposal is based on the classical work on quadratic function approxi-
mation [Bo¨hning and Lindsay, 1988] (non-secure applications) and with new theoretical analysis. In brief,
we propose to use one carefully-chosen constant matrix as a surrogate for the exact Hessian matrices (Equa-
tion 5) across all iterations. Specifically, the following approximate Hessian (denoted H˜) is proposed:
H˜ = −1
4
XTX− λI , (6)
here H˜ is a tight lower bound because for all pi ∈ [0, 1] (the probability in logistic regression), we have that:
max {ai,i = pi(1− pi)} = 14 (where ai,i denotes elements of the diagonal matrix A defined in Equation 5
for Hessian). We highlight that this approximation guarantees exact model convergence and result accuracy
(with theoretical and empirical proof later in Sections 5.1 and 6.2).
The calculation of approximate Hessian H˜ can be decomposed per-organization (horizontally parti-
tioned) and computed in a distributed manner among many organizations:
H˜ = −1
4
S∑
j=1
Xj
TXj − λI =
S∑
j=1
H˜j − λI (7)
where Xj is the (privacy-sensitive) raw data stored locally at Organization j, S is the total number of orga-
nizations contributing data, and H˜j = −14XTj Xj denotes the approximate Hessian for Organization j.
Substituting this approximate Hessian into the Newton method (Equation 3), along with the distributed
evaluation of gradient (Equation 4), the iterative updating formula for our new optimizer (denoted as PrivLogit)
follows:
β(t+1) = β(t) − [
S∑
j=1
H˜j − λI]−1 [
S∑
j=1
gj(β
(t))− λβ(t)] (8)
The above iterative process continues until model convergence. Convergence can be measured by the relative
change of log-likelihood and compared against a predefined threshold (e.g., 10−6):
|l(t+1)2 − l(t)2 |
|l(t)2 |
< 10−6 ,
where l(t+1)2 , l
(t)
2 correspond to the log-likelihood of logistic regression for Iterations (t+1), (t), respectively.
Note that based on Equation 2, the log-likelihood can also be decomposed per-organization j (whose share
is denoted lsj):
l2(β) =
S∑
j=1
lsj − λ
2
βTβ (9)
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3.3 Attractive Properties of PrivLogit.
Our new PrivLogit numerical optimizer enables a few attractive properties, which seem highly promising
for efficient privacy-preserving logistic regression.
3.3.1 Asymmetric Computational Complexity in Secure Settings
The PrivLogit adaption comes at the cost of more iterations required for convergence (and also increased
local-organization computation), which seems counter-intuitive and less favorable as more iterations mean
slower convergence. However, this view fails to consider computational cost as a whole and the different
computational characteristics of distributed model estimation with and without cryptographic protections.
In secure implementations, the local computation at each organization is essentially “free” because organi-
zations have full control of their respective private data and (extremely) fast non-secure computations are
applicable; but secure computation at the aggregation center is usually orders of magnitudes slower than
non-secure counterparts (due to expensive cryptographic protections against an adversarial center). This
implies that eliminating complexity of center-based secure computation (current bottleneck) can potentially
lead to significant speedup (as is the case in PrivLogit). Our method has very cheap per-iteration cost,
making it competitive in overall performance.
3.3.2 Constant Hessian
Our proposed Hessian approximation stays constant and independent of the varyingβ(t)’s coefficients across
all iterations. This indicates that it only needs to be evaluated and inverted once during preprocessing and can
then be reused across all iterations, leading to dramatic reduction in computation compared with traditional
Newton method.
3.3.3 Decomposition of Computation
The new optimizer allows for easy decomposition the computation among participating organizations, which
can be leveraged to achieve significant speedup. For instance, the approximate Hessian can be computed
in a distributed manner via a series of aggregations, as demonstrated in Equation 7. So is the gradient
(Equation 4).
In addition, further reduction in computation is possible after the approximate Hessian is securely in-
verted and properly protected. As will be introduced later in our second implementation PrivLogit-Local
(Section 4.2), partial Newton update direction can be computed locally by each local nodes (who has privacy-
free access to their respective private data and thus local gradient need not be encrypted). The center only
needs to securely aggregate these local Newton steps, which is highly efficient. This performance improve-
ment is unique to PrivLogit and not possible for Newton method due to varying Hessian’s.
3.3.4 Guaranteed Model Quality
Despite the approximation to Hessian, the PrivLogit optimizer is guaranteed to converge to accurate model
estimates, i.e., perfect accuracy (Sections 5.1 and 6.2).
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4 Cryptographic Implementations of PrivLogit
Based on our new PrivLogit optimization method, we propose two cryptographic protocols for privacy-
preserving distributed logistic regression. The first is called PrivLogit-Hessian which is a straightforward
cryptographic implementation of PrivLogit. Our second proposal, called PrivLogit-Local, provides even
more speedup by offsetting some expensive matrix operations to local organizations and taking advantage
of their fast and privacy-free computing power.
4.0.1 Distributed System Architecture
Both our secure protocols adopt the distributed architecture consisting of local Nodes (organizations) and
an aggregation Center (semi-honest), as illustrated in Figure 1 (common for privacy-preserving distributed
data mining [Aggarwal and Philip, 2008]). In brief, participating organizations (i.e., distributed Nodes)
are responsible for protecting their respective data and only generating (safe) summary-level data, which
would be encrypted and securely consumed by the Center for model estimation. In a strongly protected
system such as ours, all data and computations at the Center are encrypted and not visible even to the
Center itself. The role of Center is typically played by two or more mutually independent semi-trusted
authorities (denoted as different Servers in Figure 1), as is common for secure multi-party computation
applications [Aggarwal and Philip, 2008, Nikolaenko et al., 2013, Xie et al., 2014, Li et al., 2016]. In
practice, such as in biomedical or social sciences, Center(s) can be the coordinating center (of a consortium,
federation or association) in addition to a third-party authority (e.g., audit organizations). We acknowledge
there can be alternative architectures, such as Center with 3-parties [Kamm and Willemson, 2013] or even
more, or fully decentralized. However, since this is not the focus of our work and state-of-the-art are still
mostly using two-party (Center) architectures, we thus leave it as future work.
4.0.2 Choice of Cryptographic Schemes
Our proposals are agnostic of specific choices of cryptographic schemes and most existing or future cryp-
tographic schemes/primitives can be utilized. This is because, as discussed in Section 3.3, our performance
advantage comes from leveraging the drastic computational complexity asymmetry between the untrusted
Center (whose computation is orders of magnitude slower [Liu et al., 2015] due to cryptography) and dis-
tributed Nodes (whose computation is often privacy-free and extremely fast). This asymmetry is likely to
exist for the foreseeable future regardless of improvements in cryptography alone. In fact, since PrivLogit
has much simpler main computations (Equations 8 and 7) than Newton method (Equations 3 and 5), our
proposals are more widely amenable to a variety of cryptographic schemes. Since the focus of our work is
not on specific cryptographic protocols and due to space constraint, we directly adopt state-of-the-art cryp-
tographic schemes (building blocks) and skip trivial cryptographic details that are common knowledge in
privacy-preserving (distributed) data mining [Aggarwal and Philip, 2008, Nikolaenko et al., 2013, Li et al.,
2016, Xie et al., 2014].
Our current secure implementation builds on a hybrid of two widely-used cryptographic schemes: Yao’s
garbled circuit [Yao, 1982] (mainly for Type 2 computations between independent Center servers as depicted
in Figure 1) and Paillier encryption [Paillier, 1999] (mainly for Type 1 computations between local Nodes
and the Center as depicted in Figure 1). Local-node computations are mostly privacy-free. The hybrid
of garbled circuit and Paillier encryption (and the conversion between each other) is very efficient and
is state-of-the-art cryptographic protocol for various closely related tasks, including privacy-preserving
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Figure 1: Distributed architecture for privacy-preserving logistic regression. Two main types of computa-
tions are involved between: 1) local Nodes and the Center; 2) different Servers/authorities at the Center.
logistic regression and other machine learning models [Aggarwal and Philip, 2008, El Emam et al., 2013,
Nikolaenko et al., 2013, Xie et al., 2014].
4.0.3 Secure Notations
For simplicity, we use intuitive symbols to denote a few common secure mathematical arithmetics. Each
of these operations take encrypted operands as inputs, and securely compute without decryption to output
an encrypted result. As before, encrypted data are represented as Enc(.). And we denote secure addition,
subtraction, multiplication, and division as: ⊕,	,⊗,, respectively (secure square root Esqrt(.) is also
used in matrix inversion whose details are omitted in main text).
Across all secure Algorithms 1, 2, and 3 introduced below, we flag computations by their location of oc-
currence in accordance with the distributed architecture in Figure 1. This also explains what cryptographic
schemes are underlying what computations, because as mentioned earlier in Section 4, Center-based com-
putations are primarily implemented using garbled circuit, and local node-computations are privacy-free,
and the information exchange between Center and local Nodes is implemented using Paillier encryption.
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4.1 PrivLogit-Hessian: Secure Distributed PrivLogit
As presented in Algorithm 1, PrivLogit-Hessian is our straightforward secure and distributed implementa-
tion of our PrivLogit optimizer. This secure protocol consists of two phases of computation: a one-time
setup phase of securely approximating and inverting the Hessian, and a repeated (iterative) secure model
estimation phase.
Algorithm 1 PrivLogit-Hessian: Fast and Secure Logistic Regression.
Input: Random initial β(0); Regularization parameter λ
Output: Globally fit coefficient estimate β
[At local organizations and Center] :
1: Securely approximate and Cholesky-decompose (negated) Hessian: Enc(L) = SetupOnce() (where
Enc(LLT ) = Enc(−H˜)) (Algorithm 2)
2: while regression model not converged do
[At local organizations] :
3: for each organization j = 1 to S do
[At local Organization j] :
4: Compute local gradient gj and encrypt via Paillier (Equation 4)
5: Compute local log-likelihood lsj and encrypt via Paillier (Equation 9)
6: Securely transmit encryptions Enc(gj), Enc(lsj) to Center
7: end for
[At Center] :
8: Securely aggregate gradients across organizations: Enc(g) = Enc(g1) ⊕ ... ⊕ Enc(gj) ⊕ ... ⊕
Enc(gS)	 Enc(λβ(t)) (Equation 4)
9: Secure back-substitution: Enc(H˜−1g)← Enc(L) , Enc(g)
10: Securely update coefficient estimates via PrivLogit: β(t+1) ← β(t) (Equation 8)
11: Securely aggregate log-likelihood across organizations: Enc(l2) = Enc(ls1)⊕ ...⊕Enc(lsj)⊕ ...⊕
Enc(lsS)	 Enc(λ2 [β(t)]Tβ(t)) (Equation 9)
12: Securely check model convergence using secure comparison (Section 3.2)
13: Securely disseminate new coefficient estimates to each local organizations: Enc(β(t+1))
14: end while
15: return β(t) (last converged estimate)
The first phase (Step 1 in Algorithm 1 or SetupOnce() function in Algorithm 2) focuses on securely
approximating and inverting Hessian. Specifically, based on Algorithm 2, each local organizations com-
pute their local Hessian approximation H˜j (based on covariance matrix XTj Xj) and encrypt it before
sharing with the Center (Steps 1 to 4 in Algorithm 2; our current implementation uses Paillier encryp-
tion). The Center securely aggregates these encrypted per-organization Hessians (and the regularization
term as necessary), yielding an encrypted global Hessian approximation Enc(H˜) (Step 5 in Algorithm 2
and Equation 7; encryption is still based on Paillier). Later, the Center needs to securely invert the Hes-
sian, which is typically achieved by secure Cholesky decomposition on the protected (negated) Hessian and
obtains its encrypted “inversion” (the encrypted Cholesky triangular matrix Enc(L) to be precise), such
that Enc(LLT ) = Enc(−H˜). Since Cholesky decomposition is a common textbook algorithm and has
been implemented before [Nikolaenko et al., 2013] using the same cryptography as ours (garbled circuit),
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Algorithm 2 SetupOnce() for securely approximating and inverting Hessian.
Input: Local organizations with their respective data
Output: Encrypted triangular matrix Enc(L) from Cholesky decomposition (where Enc(LLT ) =
Enc(−H˜))
[At local organizations] :
1: for each organization j = 1 to S do
2: Approximate local Hessian H˜j (Equation 6)
3: Encrypt and securely transmit Enc(H˜j) to Center
4: end for
[At Center] :
5: Securely aggregate Hessians across organizations: Enc(H˜) = Enc(H˜1) ⊕ ... ⊕ Enc(H˜j) ⊕ ... ⊕
Enc(H˜S)	 Enc(λI) (Equation 6)
6: Secure Cholesky decomposition to obtain: Enc(L) (where Enc(LLT ) = Enc(−H˜))
7: return encryption Enc(L)
we omit the details for brevity. Conversion between Paillier encryption and garbled circuit follows popular
approaches [Nikolaenko et al., 2013, Xie et al., 2014]). Note that the whole phase only needs to occur once,
which is a significant improvement over Newton method-based protocols.
The second phase (Steps 2 to 14 in Algorithm 1) of PrivLogit-Hessian resembles that of the widely-used
privacy-preserving distributed Newton method [Li et al., 2016], except for the substitution of repeated Hes-
sian evaluation and inversion. Model estimation proceeds in a secure and iterative process (each execution
within while loop constitutes an iteration, as shown in Algorithm 1). Model convergence is securely checked
at each iteration using secure comparison (Steps 12 or 2 in Algorithm 1). For each iteration, local organiza-
tions only need to compute their local gradient gj and log-likelihood lsj (where j indexes each organization)
using privacy-free computation, and securely transmit their (Paillier) encryptions of these summaries to the
Center (Steps 3 to 7). The Center securely aggregates the gradient and log-likelihood submissions (using
Paillier-based secure addition), and compose the encrypted global gradient (Step 8) and log-likelihood (Step
11). Later on in Step 9, the textbook method back-substitution (similar to [Nikolaenko et al., 2013]) is se-
curely performed to derive the encrypted productEnc(H˜−1g) from previously derived encryptionsEnc(L)
andEnc(g). The Center then updates current coefficient estimates following the PrivLogit updating formula
(Step 10 and Equation 8). This iterative process continues until model converges.
4.2 PrivLogit-Local: Decentralizing More Computations.
Our second and even faster secure protocol, PrivLogit-Local, is presented in Algorithm 3. This proto-
col takes advantage of the fact that the centrally aggregated approximate Hessian H˜−1 (or encryption
Enc(H˜−1)) can be regarded as a (private) constant value. For each local Node j, local gradient gj is
privacy-free and essentially a public constant. This means that we can further distribute the expensive
(Center-based) secure matrix-vector multiplication (Step 9 in Algorithm 1 of PrivLogit-Hessian) to local
Nodes by leveraging much cheaper secure multiplication-by-constant operations locally: i.e., to locally
compute multiplication Enc(H˜−1) ⊗ gj at each Node (which can be centrally aggregated efficiently in
secure later) instead of at the Center.
In greater detail, the first step of PrivLogit-Local still involves the local organizations and Center se-
curely approximating and “inverting” the Hessian (Step 1 in Algorithm 3; or SetupOnce() in Algorithm 2),
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Algorithm 3 PrivLogit-Local: offsetting partial Newton update step to local organizations.
Input: Random initial β(0); regularization parameter λ
Output: Globally fit coefficient estimate β
[At local organizations and Center] :
1: Securely approximate and Cholesky-decompose Hessian: Enc(L) = SetupOnce() (where
Enc(LLT ) = Enc(−H˜)) (Algorithm 2)
2: Securely invert Hessian: Enc(H˜−1)← Enc(L)
3: while regression model not converged do
[At local organizations] :
4: for each organization j = 1 to S do
[At local Organization j] :
5: Compute local log-likelihood lsj and encrypt (Equation 9)
6: Compute local gradient gj (Equation 4)
7: Secure multiplication-by-constant: Enc(H˜−1gj)← Enc(H˜−1), gj ;
8: Securely send encryptions Enc(H˜−1gj), Enc(lsj) to Center
9: end for
[At Center] :
10: Securely compose global numerical updating step: Enc(H˜−1g) = Enc(H˜−1g1) ⊕ ... ⊕
Enc(H˜−1gj)⊕ ...⊕ Enc(H˜−1gS)	 Enc(λH˜−1β(t))
11: Securely update coefficient estimates via PrivLogit: β(t+1) ← β(t) (Equation 8)
12: Securely aggregate log-likelihood across organizations: Enc(l2) = Enc(ls1) ⊕ Enc(ls2) ⊕ ... ⊕
Enc(lsj)	 Enc(λ2 [β(t)]Tβ(t)) (Equation 9)
13: Securely check model convergence using secure comparison (Section 3.2)
14: Securely disseminate new coefficient estimates to each local organiztions: Enc(β(t+1))
15: end while
16: return β(t) (last converged estimate)
similar to Phase 1 of PrivLogit-Hessian. Next, we directly materialize the inversion of approximate Hes-
sian in encrypted form, i.e., Enc(H˜−1). After that, this encrypted inversion is disseminated to each local
organizations where local computation of gradients only involves privacy-free operations.
Later on, at each iteration, local organizations derive their various local summaries (just as the standard
secure Newton method or our PrivLogit-Hessian), such as log-likelihood (Step 5) and gradient (Step 6). In
addition, per earlier observation, they compute their respective versions of (partial) Newton updating step,
by using efficient secure multiplication primitives (Step 7). Since the local gradients gj do not involve pri-
vacy concerns at their respective local organizations (thus can be regarded as a public constant value), the
computation is greatly simplified to highly efficient secure multiplication-by-constant primitives in Paillier.
Afterwards, local organizations securely send their respective encrypted summariesEnc(H˜−1gj), Enc(lsj)
back to the Center (Step 8). For regularized logistic regression, the regularization term also needs to be
securely composed, which can be prepared by the local organizations and then aggregated centrally, i.e.,
Enc(λH˜−1β(t)) = Enc(H˜−1
∑S
j=1 λβ
(t)
j ). Finally, the Center only needs to perform trivial secure ag-
gregation to complete the PrivLogit model updating process and secure convergence check (Steps 10 to
13).
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The correctness of Algorithm 3 is straightforward (i.e., offsetting matrix multiplication to local Nodes).
Briefly, H˜−1g = H˜−1(
∑
j gj − λβ) =
∑
j H˜
−1gj − λH˜−1β.
Building on top of PrivLogit-Hessian, our second protocol PrivLogit-Local further avoids expensive
secure matrix multiplication (between encryptions), which leads to significantly simplified computation and
less overhead than PrivLogit-Hessian and baseline Newton. Due to simplicity of computation equation, this
also makes PrivLogit-Local more widely amenable to a variety of cryptographic schemes.
5 Theoretical Proof and Analysis
In this section, we present theoretical analysis and proof for our proposals regarding computational com-
plexity, and model convergence.
5.1 Proof on Model Convergence and Result Accuracy
Since our PrivLogit introduced approximation to Hessian, the convergence properties of standard Newton
no longer apply. We thus present theoretical proof regarding the convergence properties of PrivLogit, which
is based on quadratic function approximation [Bo¨hning and Lindsay, 1988]. We show that our PrivLogit
optimizer is guaranteed to converge to the optimum (i.e., it always converges and converges with exact
model accuracy), and at a linear convergence rate. Specifically, we prove the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Assume the optimal solution β∗ to the objective function l2(β) (Equation 2) exists and is
unique. Let {β(t)} be a sequence generated by PrivLogit with the update formula in Equation 8. The
sequence has the following properties:
(a) l2(β(t+1)) > l2(β(t)) and β(t) will converge to the optimal solution β∗.
(b) The rate of convergence of PrivLogit method is linear.
Proof.
(a) By using the negative definiteness of H˜ and the second-order Taylor expansion of l2(β), we have,
l2(β
(t+1))− l2(β(t))
= −g(β(t))ᵀH˜−1g(β(t))+ 1
2
g(β(t))ᵀH˜−1H(βˆ)H˜−1g(β(t))
> −g(β(t))ᵀH˜−1g(β(t)) + 1
2
g(β(t))ᵀH˜−1H˜H˜−1g(β(t))
= −1
2
g(β(t))ᵀH˜−1g(β(t)) > 0
where βˆ is between β(t) and β(t+1).
The objective function l2(β) is strictly concave with a negative definite Hessian matrix and therefore
is maximized at the optimal solution β∗. From the previous derivation, we obtain the lower bound of the
increment of the objective function at each iteration. If g(β(t)) is bounded away from 0 for all t, in other
words, ||g(β(t))|| >  for some positive constant , then the increment of each iteration is also bounded
above 0, which contradicts the upper boundedness of the objective function. Therefore, g(β(t)) → 0 as
t→∞, which means the sequence {β(t)} converges to the optimal solution β∗.
13
(b) Since XᵀX is positive semi-definite, its eigenvalues are all non-negative. Denote the biggest eigen-
value of XᵀX as λmax. Furthermore, we also assume XᵀAX is positive definite at every iteration, with the
smallest eigenvalue λmin > 0. Then we have
− 11
4λmax + λ
I  H˜−1
and
−(λmin + λ)I  H(β)  −(1
4
λmax + λ)I
Let M = 14λmax + λ and m = λ
min + λ. By the strong concavity assumption and the second-order
Taylor expansion of l2, we have for any υ and ω in the parameter space,
l2(ω) < l2(υ) + g(υ)
ᵀ(ω − υ)− 1
2
m||ω − υ||22
< l2(υ) +
||g(υ)||22
2m
Since the inequality holds everywhere in the parameter space, we have ||g(υ)||22 > 2m(l2(β∗)− l2(υ)) for
any υ. Next we need to investigate the relation between l2(β∗)− l2(β(t+1)) and l2(β∗)− l2(β(t)) for all t.
From part(a), we have
l2(β
(t+1)) > l2(β
(t))− 1
2
g(β(t))ᵀH˜−1g(β(t))
> l2(β
(t)) +
1
2M
||g(β(t))||22
Subtracting both sides from l2(β∗) , we get
l2(β
∗)− l2(β(t+1)) < l2(β∗)− l2(β(t))− 1
2M
||g(β(t))||22
< (1− m
M
)(l2(β
∗)− l2(β(t)))
< (1− m
M
)t(l2(β
∗)− l2(β(1)))
where the factor 1− m
M
< 1. It shows that l2(β(t)) converges in a linear rate to β∗ as t→∞.
5.2 Complexity Analysis
Here we roughly analyze the computational complexity of the operations involved. Since cryptographic
operations are dominating the total computation of secure protocols (often orders of magnitudes more ex-
pensive than non-secure computations), we thus focus on cryptography-related procedures only.
For gradient g ∈ Rp and Hessian H ∈ Rp×p, the main operations concerning cryptographic protection
are: matrix inversion or closely related Cholesky decomposition (Equations 3 and 6) (O(p3) complexity),
matrix-vector multiplication (Equations 3 and 6) (O(p2) complexity), and back-substitution (Step 9 in Al-
gorithm 1) (O(p2)).
State-of-the-art privacy-preserving Newton method requires repeated Hessian inversion and matrix mul-
tiplication, with total complexity of O(p3 × Newton iterations).
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PrivLogit in general requires one step of Hessian inversion, and many iterations of matrix-vector mul-
tiplication, with total complexity of O(p3 + p2 × PrivLogit iterations). Note that specifically for
PrivLogit-Local, the second complexity term involving p2 is much lower (i.e., much smaller constant factor
in terms of empirical complexity) than PrivLogit-Hessian because secure multiplication-by-constant primi-
tive (the main computation involved) is much more efficient than secure multiplication of two encryptions
(as in PrivLogit-Hessian).
Since the strict relationship between p and iteration numbers (of Newton and PrivLogit) is not deter-
mined, performance improvement is not strictly guaranteed for directly applying PrivLogit (as in the case
of PrivLogit-Hessian) over Newton method. This is a limitation of one related alternative [Nardi et al.,
2012]. In practice, we show that PrivLogit tends to have lower amortized cost, since PrivLogit iterations
have very low cost. And this advantage grows with data dimensionality p. Our second adaption PrivLogit-
Local is guaranteed to outperform Newton and the speedup is significant, because it replaces most iterations
of Newton with extremely fast secure multiplication-by-constant steps.
5.3 Privacy Leaks and Security Guarantees
As is common for privacy-preserving distributed data mining [Aggarwal and Philip, 2008], our work fol-
lows the privacy definition of cryptography and secure multi-party computation, and assumes the honest-
but-curious adversary model [Goldreich, 2001], where the adversary always follows the prescribed protocol,
but may attempt to learn additional knowledge from the information flowed by. We emphasize that our se-
cure protocols PrivLogit-Hessian and PrivLogit-Local directly adopt existing secure primitives and building
blocks (i.e., garbled circuits [Yao, 1982], Paillier encryption [Paillier, 1999], and efficient conversion pro-
tocols), which are state-of-the-art and widely-used in the domain and whose security are well understood.
Our work simply hybrids them in efficient ways to safeguard PrivLogit, whose security proof is straight-
forward based on security composition theorem [Goldreich, 2001]. Since detailed security analysis of such
hybrid protocols is straightforward and widely available in secure Newton baseline and privacy-preserving
(distributed) data mining [Nikolaenko et al., 2013, Aggarwal and Philip, 2008] and is not our focus or
contribution (i.e., performance improvement from non-cryptography components), we only provide con-
cise security analysis due to space constraint. Also, as is typical for cryptographic protocols [Aggarwal
and Philip, 2008], our protocols only focus on protecting raw and intermediate data/computation, but not
final result/output privacy. The latter belongs to a separate topic on differential privacy [Chaudhuri and
Monteleoni, 2009] which is beyond the scope of our work.
Our protocols do disclose the regression coefficients (model output) to distributed Nodes and the number
of iterations in numerical optimization. Most such leaks are inherent to the nature of cryptography in general
(e.g., non-linear functions including logistic regression model cannot be directly and efficiently implemented
fully in secure, requiring either revealing regression coefficients or noisy approximations), and numerical
optimization (being iterative and distributed means that network communication pattern or iterations number
is always observable). Since enhancing security of inherently hard problems is beyond the scope of this work
and due to space constraint, our analysis only focuses on new materials not widely available in literature.
In addition, intermediate model outputs (revealed to local Nodes) share the same privacy properties
as the final model output of the whole protocol, because they are all simply regression coefficients. By
definition, cryptographic protocols do not protect final output, so this practice does not violate security. The
only possible way to breach security in PrivLogit protocols is for local Nodes to accumulate all regression
coefficients across all iterations and form a linear equation system to solve for individual record-level input
values [O’Keefe and Chipperfield, 2013, El Emam et al., 2013]. However, since the number of iterations
is quite small (at most linear in dimensionality p) and the (privacy-sensitive) data – the attack target – is
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huge in size (n × p, where n is extremely large), the system is severely undetermined and such attacks are
infeasible from information theory standpoint.
Except for the two aforementioned leaks, our secure protocols provides comprehensive security guar-
antees, leveraging proven cryptographic schemes and hybrid protocols. In both PrivLogit-Hessian and
PrivLogit-Local, local-Node summaries are encrypted prior to submission to guarantee privacy. In PrivLogit-
Local, the inverted approximate Hessian is also encrypted before being shared with local Nodes. At the
aggregation Center, all incoming inputs are encrypted in Paillier or Yao’s garbled circuit shares. All data,
computations and results are also encrypted. Based on the composition theorem of security [Goldreich,
2001], the composition of these secure sub-protocols also yield a secure protocol overall.
6 Experiments
We implement both PrivLogit-Hessian and PrivLogit-Local in Java. Our garbled circuit is executed using
state-of-the-art cryptography framework ObliVM-GC [Liu et al., 2015], which already provides thousands
of times speedup over earlier works in our case. We use common privacy-preserving floating-point represen-
tations [Nikolaenko et al., 2013]. We use 2048-bit security parameter for encryption and other latest security
parameters in ObliVM-GC. Secure Newton method and logistic regression has been explored by different
communities and with different relaxations (to make computation feasible), but most were proposed prior
to the fast ObliVM-GC framework and no open-source code is available as our baseline, making it difficult
for direct and fair comparison. To set a directly comparable baseline, we thus also implement state-of-the-
art privacy-preserving distributed Newton method using latest cryptography (same as our protocols), which
may be of separate interest. We run all experiments between two commodity PCs with 2.5 GHz quad-core
CPU and 16 GB memory, connected via ethernet.
Our empirical evaluations focus on the following criteria: 1) Model estimation quality (the accuracy of
estimated coefficients) (in Section 6.2); 2) Model convergence performance (in Section 6.3). Due to space
limit, we have to omit numerical stability results (that PrivLogit is always guaranteed to converge, while
Newton is not), which has already been theoretically proved in Section 5.1 and does not affect our final
conclusions.
In our experiments concerning numerical optimizers (i.e., PrivLogit and Newton method), we randomly
initialize first coefficient estimates as commonly suggested (e.g., 0 as initial guess). We use 10−6 as our
stopping threshold when checking model convergence (i.e., relative change of likelihood). Other thresholds
have also been tested, such as 10−7 and 10−8, which does not affect our main conclusions and thus are
omitted.
6.1 Datasets
Our empirical evaluation includes a series of simulated and real-world studies, covering a wide spectrum of
applications from different domains and of different scales.
Among these, we have compiled four real-world studies, including: 1) the Wine quality study (with
6,497 samples and 12 features) [Cortez et al., 2009] for predicting wine quality from physicochemical tests,
2) online Loans data (with 122, 578 samples and 33 features) from Lending Club [LengingClub, 2016]
for studying loan default status from loan application data, 3) company Insurance study (of dimension:
9, 882×38) for predicting caravan issurance from demographic information and personal finance attributes,
and 4) News dataset (of dimension 39, 082 × 52) [Fernandes et al., 2015] for predicting the popularity of
Mashable.com news from article features.
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To make our evaluations more comprehensive, we have also simulated a series of studies with vary-
ing data scales, including: SimuX10 (of dimension 50, 000 × 10), SimuX12 (1, 000, 000 × 12), SimuX50
(1, 000, 000× 50), SimuX100 (3, 000, 000× 100), SimuX150 (4, 000, 000× 150), SimuX200 (5, 000, 000×
200), SimuX400 (50, 000, 000 × 400), etc. We also evaluated on additional studies with various data sizes
and numbers of participating organizations. Since these factors do not have direct influence on the secure
computation process (which primarily concerns summary data) both theoretically and empirically, we do
not report on them separately. We following standard data simulation approach, by randomly generating
covariates X ∈ Rn×p and coefficients β ∈ Rp×1, and then deriving responses y ∈ Rn×p according to
Bernoulli distribution.
These evaluation datasets should be representative for most large-scale studies in our focused domains
in the foreable future. We also randomly partition datasets into subsets (by row or horizontally) in order to
emulate different organizations in collaborative studies.
6.2 Model Accuracy
First, we demonstrate that our proposals obtain accurate results (i.e., regression coefficients). The standard
non-secure distributed Newton method serves as the ground truth. Based on our theoretical proof on exact
model accuracy (part of Section 5.1), our hypothesis is that despite the significant change in our numerical
optimizer and reliance on cryptographic operations, the accuracy of our model estimation should still be
guaranteed.
Numerical results have confirmed our hypothesis, as is illustrated in the QQ-plots in Figure 2. Specifi-
cally, our β coefficient estimates from PrivLogit-Hessian and PrivLogit-Local are in perfect alignment with
the ground-truth Newton across all studies, with correlation R2 = 1.00 (perfect correlation and accuracy).
This implies that the approximate Hessian adaption we introduced in PrivLogit still maintains exact
model accuracy. Moreover, it also confirms that the various cryptographic protections underlying PrivLogit-
Hessian and PrivLogit-Local have no influence on the model quality.
6.3 Computational Performance
Next, we evaluate the computational performance of PrivLogit-Hessian and PrivLogit-Local in terms of
model convergence with respect to iterations count and total runtime. We partition each evaluation datasets
into 4∼20 blocks horizontally (i.e., by rows) to emulate different data-contributing organizations. As it has
been demonstrated both theoretically and empirically that cryptographic protections do not affect the accu-
racy of computation in our case, we refer to our two secure protocols as PrivLogit in general for simplicity.
Our model convergence threshold is set at 10−6, as mentioned earlier.
Iterations to convergence As is illustrated in Figure 3, all protocols managed to converge within a rea-
sonable number of iterations. For instance, the Loans study (of dimension: 122, 578 × 33) requires 6 and
17 iterations, respectively, to converge for the Newton and our PrivLogit-based secure proposals. For the
smaller Insurance study, it takes 7 (for Newton) and 59 (for PrivLogit) iterations, respectively. As the data
size (especially dimensionality) increases, we observe increases in the number of iterations both for Newton
and PrivLogit, with the former growing slower. For instance, SimuX150 (with 4 millions samples and 150
features) requires 7 iterations for Newton (only 17% increase over Loans) and 83 iterations for PrivLogit
(388% increase over Loans).
Judging from model convergence iterations, PrivLogit seems “unfavorable” to Newton, as PrivLogit
often requires a few tens of or more iterations, while the latter seems significantly faster with only single-
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Figure 2: Result accuracy comparison across various datasets, as measured by QQ-plot of model coefficients
estimated by ours (PrivLogit-Hessian and PrivLogit-Local; y-axis) vs. “ground-truth” Newton baseline (x-
axis). PrivLogit-Hessian (in black) and PrivLogit-Local (in blue) points totally overlapped and both were
perfectly aligned along the diagonal, showing exact result accuracy (perfect correlation ofR2 = 1.00 against
baseline Newton).
digit number of iterations. The elongated convergence rate is perhaps the main reason why methods similar
to PrivLogit have never been considered in the data security and privacy community. However, we will soon
refute such a misconception by comparing the total runtime.
Convergence runtime Surprisingly, detailed runtime benchmark in Table 2 manifests that both our secure
protocols, i.e., PrivLogit-Hessian and PrivLogit-Local, turn out to be quite competitive in computational
performance. For instance, in the Loans study, while Newton method takes only 6 iterations, its actual
runtime reaches as much as 492 seconds (because of expensive per-iteration computation); On the other
hand, despite requiring substantially more iterations (i.e., 17), our PrivLogit-Hessian and PrivLogit-Local
protocols only take around 260 and 104 seconds, respectively, leading to 1.9x and 4.7x speedup, respectively.
For even larger-scale studies such as SimuX150, Newton method takes 42,951 seconds or roughly 12 hours.
PrivLogit-Hessian and PrivLogit-Local are respectively 1.7x and 7.1x times faster than Newton in this case.
One interesting observation is that in rare occasions, PrivLogit-Hessian can be slightly slower than
Newton. For instance, the Insurance study requires around 843 seconds for Newton (for 7 iterations), but
978 seconds (1.16x slower) for PrivLogit-Hessian. This indicates that directly applying PrivLogit (i.e.,
PrivLogit-Hessian) does not guarantee improvement. Our second protocol, PrivLogit-Local, however, al-
ways outperforms Newton with dramatic speedup: requiring only 144 seconds (5.9x speedup).
Overall, PrivLogit-Local constantly outperforms other methods with significant speedup, while PrivLogit-
Hessian is generally faster than Newton most of the time.
Furthermore, we also test on datasets with dimensions as high as 400, a scale that has never been
reported before for privacy-preserving logistic regression (not even for a much simpler linear regression
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Figure 3: Convergence iterations of PrivLogit and the Newton method baseline on real-world (upper panel)
and simulated (lower panel) datasets. Red horizontal line denotes the stopping threshold.
model [Nikolaenko et al., 2013]). Unfortunately, only PrivLogit-Local converges within reasonable time
(110,598 seconds or roughly 1.28 days; for 206 iterations). The other two protocols still did not complete
after 4 days. While PrivLogit-Hessian did not complete, its convergence iterations is expected to be the
same as PrivLogit-Local (i.e., 206 iterations) since they implement the same optimization algorithm. For
Newton method, a non-secure implementation requires 8 iterations.
Relative speedup To better demonstrate the relative performance of PrivLogit-Hessian and PrivLogit-
Local over existing secure Newton methods, we extensively benchmark the relative speedup of our methods
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Table 2: Model convergence iterations and runtime (in seconds) benchmark for Newton, PrivLogit,
PrivLogit-Hessian, PrivLogit-Local.
Dataset
Iterations
Newton
Iterations
PrivLogit
Time
Newton
Time (S)
PrivLogit-Hessian
Time (S)
PrivLogit-Local
Wine 5 13 32 24 17
Loans 6 17 492 260 104
Insurance 7 59 843 978 144
News 5 13 1442 621 313
SimuX10 6 20 26 24 13
SimuX12 6 22 38 37 17
SimuX50 6 32 1549 1052 383
SimuX100 7 59 13138 7817 1807
SimuX150 7 83 42951 25030 6055
SimuX200 8 105 114522 56917 14105
SimuX400 8 206 N/A N/A 110598
over the baseline Newton. As illustrated in Figure 4, PrivLogit-Hessian outperforms Newton most of the
time (except for one occurrence of Insurance), and the speedup is between 1.03x∼2.32x. For PrivLogit-
Local, the speedup is even more striking, with a speedup of up to 8.1x. For small datasets, PrivLogit-Local
is around 2x faster than Newton; for medium datasets such as Loans, Insurance, News, its speedup is around
4x∼6x. The largest increase in relative performance is from PrivLogit-Local on the SimuX200 dataset,
with 8.1x speedup. PrivLogit-Hessian also performs well, with 2x speedup. In general, as data dimension
increases, we see much more relative efficiency gain for both PrivLogit-Hessian and PrivLogit-Local.
Overall, this provides further evidence that our secure PrivLogit proposals have better performance
compared to state-of-the-art privacy-preserving distributed Newton method, and our relative competitive
advantage increases along with data scale. This indicates that our methods hold much better potential for
large-scale studies in the big data era.
7 Related Works
Privacy-preserving regression analysis and machine learning in general is actively investigated. Here we
discuss several closely related lines of research.
7.1 Cryptographic Protections on Logistic Regression and Other Models
Extensive efforts have focused on protecting privacy in logistic regression, from centralized solutions [El Emam
et al., 2013] to distributed architecture [Karr et al., 2007, Wolfson et al., 2010, Nardi et al., 2012, Li et al.,
2015, Wu et al., 2012b,a]. Due to complexity of securely computing logistic function, many existing propos-
als compromise on security guarantee by providing no or only weak protections over intermediate summary
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Figure 4: Relative speedup of PrivLogit-Hessian and PrivLogit-Local over the secure distributed Newton
baseline (the y = 1 line), across various datasets. Our protocols can speed-up the computation by up to
2.32x and 8.1x (and even more), respectively.
data [Wolfson et al., 2010, Wu et al., 2012a, Li et al., 2016], which can be problematic given various in-
ference attacks [O’Keefe and Chipperfield, 2013, Xie et al., 2014, El Emam et al., 2013]. Other works
approximate the logistic function, resulting in accuracy loss [Nardi et al., 2012, El Emam et al., 2013, Aono
et al., 2016]. Nearly all existing works directly apply mainstream model estimation algorithms (i.e., Newton
method) without customization. Our proposal, however, provides a secure computing-centric perspective,
and proposes a tailored optimizer specifically for cryptography that significantly outperforms alternatives
while guaranteeing accuracy and privacy.
Hessian approximation was briefly explored by [Nardi et al., 2012], but without justification or even
(comparative) performance evaluation. Our results show that direct application of the method does not
necessarily lead to better performance, and even when it does, the improvement is modest. In addition, for
datasets of size n × p, Newton method has per-iteration complexity O(np2 + p3) (where the first term is
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dominating the cost). And the main improvement of approximate Hessian is by limiting the first term np2 to
one occurrence only (as in [Nardi et al., 2012]). However, our use case is different as our local-organization
computation is privacy-free (i.e., independent from sample size n) and total cost is only determined by
the second term O(p3), making it not obvious of the benefits of approximate Hessian. In fact, there is no
performance guarantee if directly adopting approximate Hessian in our situation.
Cryptography is also widely used to safeguard other machine learning models, as partially reviewed by
[Aggarwal and Philip, 2008].
7.2 Perturbation-based Privacy Protection
Perturbing data via artificial noise is also a popular technique for privacy preservation (e.g., k−anonymity,
differential privacy [Chaudhuri and Monteleoni, 2009]). However, since such methods inherently change
the data and computation output, their results may no longer be scientifically valid and thus are not widely
accepted in practice. In addition, they do not protect the computation process, which is the central goal of
cryptography-based protections.
7.3 Improved Numerical Optimization for Regression
Numerical optimization for regression analytics is under extensive investigation. These include various ef-
forts to approximate or eliminate the Hessian from Newton-style optimizers, such as the Quasi-Newton or
Hessian-free optimization (e.g., BFGS and L-BFGS [Liu and Nocedal, 1989]). However, none of them have
seen adoption in data security and privacy research, partially because they are heavily tailored for privacy-
free scenarios and often data-dependent and thus difficult for cryptographic implementation. Hessian ap-
proximation was described in the 1980s for maximum likelihood (in privacy-free applications) [Bo¨hning
and Lindsay, 1988], but only with limited adoption in practice maybe due to their not-obvious efficiency
improvement for privacy-free settings.
8 Discussion & Conclusion
In PrivLogit-Hessian and PrivLogit-Local, the network bandwidth and transmission cost is small, since the
encrypted summary information exchanged has very minimal size even for large studies, especially given
that Hessian only needs to be preprocessed once. Since these factors are already accounted for in the total
runtime benchmark, we omit detailed discussion for brevity.
The PrivLogit optimizer is designed for secure computing in general and agonostic of specific crypto-
graphic schemes. Thus our empirical evaluation is focused on showing further speedup on top of state-of-
the-art cryptography. There is room for further acceleration on our protocols as cryptography continues
to improve, especially given that our computation is significantly simpler than baseline Newton. However,
since our work focuses on relative speedup (excluding improvement in cryptography alone) and we aim to
provide a direct comparison with state-of-the-art based on the same cryptography primitives, we leave it as
future work to explore alternative cryptographic schemes.
While our work focuses on logistic regression model, our proposal of tailoring optimizers for secure
computing seems widely applicable to privacy-preserving machine learning, as mainstream (distributed)
numerical optimizers are not necessarily competitive for secure computing despite their wide and “direct”
adoption in data security and privacy. We consider extending this novel approach to other machine learning
models, such as other classifiers [Zheng et al., 2017], regressors, and deep learning [Beaulieu-Jones and
Greene, 2016] that are increasingly popular in privacy-sensitive domains.
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8.1 Conclusion
In this work, we have made a novel observation about a generic performance bottleneck in privacy-preserving
logistic regression, and proposed an improved numerical optimizer (i.e., PrivLogit) and demonstrate its ob-
scure but surprisingly competitive performance for privacy-preserving logistic regression. This contrasts to
common practice in privacy-preserving data mining (i.e., directly applying mainstream numerical optimiza-
tion), which often disregards secure computing-specific characteristics and thus misses valuable opportuni-
ties for significant performance boost. Based on PrivLogit, we also propose two secure and highly-efficient
protocols for privacy-preserving logistic regression. We validate our proposals extensively using both an-
alytical and empirical evaluations. Results indicate that our proposals outperform alternatives by several
times while ensuring privacy and accuracy. Our methods should be helpful for making privacy-preserving
logistic regression more scalable and practical for large collaborative studies. And our novel and generic
perspective on tailoring optimizers for secure computing should also inspire other research in secure data
management in general.
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